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The cases assembled in this special issue provide a rich setting for an exami-
nation of a number of cooperative conversion and restructurings that have occurred
over the last 10 years. The cases also provide some lessons on the larger cooperative
problems and questions in which cooperative researchers have been interested. The
cases suggest that some of the conversions and restructurings are due to what can
simply be called poor management, something that is not unique to co-ops, but is
in fact common to all business enterprises regardless of their structure. At the same
time, the cases also point out that common structural problems associated with co-
operatives – such as lack of capital, property right problems and portfolio problems
– do have an impact on the structure chosen by cooperatives and their members.
Finally, a number of case-study authors point to increasing capital requirements
in industrialized agriculture as a signiﬁcant challenge for cooperatives seeking to
integrate along the supply chain.
Introduction
Cooperatives are an enduring institution in the farm and food economy. Yet, the
beginning of the 21st century appears to mark an important period in the history
of agricultural cooperatives. Starting in 2000, critical structural changes began to
occur among agricultural co-ops in the United States and Canada. A number of
large co-ops ﬁled for bankruptcy or converted to investor-owned ﬁrms (IOF) to
remain ﬁnancially viable.1 Conversions and restructurings also occurred for other
reasons, including the need for the co-op to obtain additional capital, the need to
reduce members’ production and price risk, and the desire by members to be able
to access their equity or realize the market value of the co-op. Are these isolated
events or an on-going trend? What can be learned from these events that can be
useful to other cooperatives?
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The cases considered in this special issue were assembled to shed light on these
and other questions. The case studies are the work of twenty-two researchers from
across the United States and Canada with a keen interest in offering explanations as
to why some agricultural cooperatives have failed while others have persevered and
thrived through the various challenges that the agricultural industry has faced over
the last decade.
While the included cases represent only a portion of the co-ops that were in-
volved in some kind of restructuring, they do capture many of the types of restruc-
turing that occurred and address many of the factors involved. As we will outline in
this overview, a number of common themes and issues appear throughout the cases.
The identiﬁcation and illumination of these common themes through in-depth case
studies was one of the objectives of this special issue.
To ensure that common themes were identiﬁed, the case studies were conceived
of as research cases, rather than decision cases. Thus, instead of presenting the de-
tails of a case and asking – “What should the manager do when confronted with this
situation?” – the approach taken was to identify a conceptual framework through
which the case could be examined and understood. These conceptual frameworks
are drawn from the economics of cooperatives literature and include property rights
issues, life cycle theories, agency problems, market power, free rider issues and
horizon problems. A comparison of the conceptual frameworks used to analyze the
various cases allows common themes to be identiﬁed. This comparison also allows
at least two bigger issues to be examined regarding the stability of the cooperative
business form.
The ﬁrst of these involves one of the key questions that runs through economics,
namely the nature of the optimal form of business structure. For the economic anal-
ysis of cooperatives, the issues are speciﬁcally whether the co-op business form
is efﬁcient and whether this form will be eventually replaced by the the investor-
owned business form. By explicitly examining the restructuring of co-ops to other
business forms (and vice-versa), the articles in this special issue are uniquely placed
to assist in addressing this long-standing question of interest. While all the case
studies implicitly consider this question, a number of them explicitly raise the ques-
tion of whether the cooperative failure or restructuring was due to unique co-op fea-
tures, or whether these changes in business form occurred because of what could be
called business factors – i.e., problems such as poor management which can occur
in any ﬁrm.
The second, and related, question that a comparison of the elements found in the
conceptual models can shed light on is whether something structural has happened
to agriculture in the last 20 years to make cooperatives less organizationally stable.
The obvious source for a structural change is the so-called “industrialization of agri-
culture.” Numerous authors have speculated that agricultural industrialization will,Vol. 23[2009] iii
by removing what has historically been the foundation of agricultural cooperatives,
namely the independent farmer, create a situation where co-ops are not required to
solve the market failures and informational problems that they had previously ad-
dressed. As we will argue below, the structure of agriculture does appear to have
played a role, although perhaps not in the way that has traditionally been argued.
Conceptual Framework Themes
Among the co-ops examined in the case studies, there are four examples of
failure (deﬁned as bankruptcy, start-up failure, or business closing), ﬁve examples
of conversion to investor-owned companies, and four examples of signiﬁcant re-
structuring (alliances, innovations in capitalization, and chapter 11 restructuring).
One way to classify the cases is to group them into three broad groups: (1) those
that went into bankruptcy or converted to an IOF because of poor ﬁnancial perfor-
mance; (2) those that converted to an IOF because of a need to acquire additional
capital or a desire to access market value; and (3) those that were in the process of
forming or were re-engaging in the market (for example, after bankruptcy). Table
1 provides a list of the co-ops examined in the case studies and the group to which
they belong.
As will be seen, these groupings are useful in examining the factors that appear
to be at work in the cooperative restructurings that were examined. Not all of the
factors, however, lined up with the groupings – there were a number of factors that
cut across the groupings. The next three subsections examine insights that emerge
from considering the factors that correspond with the groupings, while the remain-
der explore those issues that cut across groups.
Management and Oversight
Not surprisingly, all the co-ops that belong to the ﬁrst group were identiﬁed as
suffering from poor management and/or a failure to modernize their operations (this
includes relocating geographically as production and marketing patterns shifted)
– after all, poor ﬁnancial performance is almost by deﬁnition the result of poor
Table 1. Co-op Case Groupings
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
Tri Valley Growers Dakota Growers Pasta Co. West Liberty Foods
Rice Growers Assoc. Agricore United Amer. Native Beef Co-op
Lilydale Diamond Walnut Growers N. Amer. Bison Co-op
SK Wheat Pool Pro-Fac United Producers Inc.
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management. Rather than re-focus on core values in response to tight markets, the
managersofthecooperativesinthesecasessoughtrefugeinboldnewstrategiesthat
were sold as signiﬁcant new investment opportunities. It is intriguing that in two
of these cases, Rice Growers Association (RGA) and Tri Valley Growers (TVG),
the failing ﬁrms were survived by sister cooperatives – Farmers’ Rice Cooperative
(FRC) and Paciﬁc Coast Producers – within the same industry who managed to
survive by maintaining a focus on service to members. These instances suggest
that poor management may simply reﬂect a normal business outcome, and not the
outcome of some ﬂaw in the cooperative business model.
Itisinterestingtonotethatmostoftheco-opsthatwereidentiﬁedashavingpoor
management were also identiﬁed as having signiﬁcant agency problems (e.g., lack
of effective oversight by the board). This latter observation is important because it
may shed some light on the reasons behind the poor management decisions and the
consequent reduction in ﬁnancial viability.
While most of the case studies only hint at why poor management may go hand
in hand with problematic agency relations, the case study on the Saskatchewan
Wheat Pool (SWP) suggests one reason – management overconﬁdence and hubris.
The SWP case sketches out a complex relationship between management overcon-
ﬁdence and lack of board oversight, with overconﬁdence affecting oversight and
vice-versa.
A useful avenue for future research would be to dig more deeply into the various
behavioral relationships that exist in cooperative management and governance and
to try and identify the root causes of poor management decisions and a lack of
oversight. Regardless, however, of the mechanisms by which lack of oversight and
management performance are connected, the case studies make it clear that this
is an issue to which cooperatives need to pay particular attention if they wish to
remain ﬁnancially viable.
Cooperative Beneﬁts and Objectives
It would seem self evident that a cooperative that converts to investor ownership
(either with the support of management or via a hostile offer from investors directly
to members) with full member support is furthering the economic interests of mem-
bers. But is it? If members are treated differently as a result of conversion and, in
particular, if over the long run markets become less competitive, then perhaps not.
Just as investors considering the purchase of a given set of assets will carefully
examine their long run earnings potential under investor ownership, cooperative
members should attempt to value those same assets from a patron perspective when
they are used by a cooperative. Unfortunately, little is known about “cooperativeVol. 23[2009] v
valuation”; most work on corporate ﬁnance and valuation presumes an investor fo-
cus.
The case studies that comprise group 2 shed some light on these issues. Speciﬁ-
cally, the cases nicely point out the issues that emerge when cooperatives reorganize
to access additional capital or to realize market value.
First, it needs to be pointed out that reorganizing to access additional capital
and reorganizing to realize market value, while conceptually distinct, are closely
related and can often not be separated. It is for this reason that the various cases in
group 2 have been grouped together. While it is perhaps clear in the FCStone (FCS)
case that the members undertook a conversion to realize the considerable value that
was present in the company, even here the desire to access additional capital to fully
capitalize on the market opportunities available was identiﬁed as a factor behind the
conversion. In the other cases considered, however, the separation cannot so easily
be made. For instance, in both the Dakota Growers Pasta Company (DGPC) case
and the Diamond Walnut Growers (DWG) case, the conversions occurred in part
to provide older members with access to their accumulated equity. The value that
could be realized for this equity, as well as the capital that was available for the
co-op, depended critically on the ﬁnancial structure chosen by the co-op.
Although conversion did allow the co-ops to access additional capital and cur-
rent members to access their equity more easily (and, in some cases, to realize a
signiﬁcant capital gain on their equity investment), these were not the only impacts
of the conversion. As an example, the DWG conversion resulted in some former
co-op members facing a potential monopsonistic processor in the post-conversion
period. The FCS case also examines what happened post conversion, concluding
that the market for risk management services remains competitive and thus the for-
mer co-op members are not disadvantaged on that score. While the issue of post-
conversion market performance was not explicitly identiﬁed for the other cases in
this group, it could nevertheless emerge as an issue in these other co-ops. Indeed,
there is evidence that Pro-Fac explicitly recognized this issue and negotiated long-
term contracts that would reduce the opportunities for opportunistic behavior by
buyers with which they are now contractually obligated to deal. As pointed out in
the DWG case, however, the determination of future market structure may be difﬁ-
cult to do at the time of conversion.
Even without the emergence of a monopolistic market structure ex post, the
question arises as to what should be the driving principle when producers make
decisions about companies that they own. As the Agricore United (AU) case ar-
gues, continued member control, rather than the maximization of share value, is a
legitimate objective and one that members should be able to pursue.vi Journal of Cooperatives
Cooperative Structure
The case studies in group 3 – by focusing on co-ops at the time they are forming
or re-engaging with the market – provide insights into some of the key problems
that have to be addressed in the architecture of co-ops. These problems include
free rider issues (United Producers Inc. (UPI)), agency problems (managerial op-
portunism in the case of North American Bison Cooperative (NABC) and overall
operational performance in the West Liberty case), and the inability of members to
supply sufﬁcient capital (American Native Beef Cooperative (ANBC)).
As the cases make clear, ﬁnding solutions to these problems affects the organi-
zational structure chosen by the cooperative. In the UPI case, the co-op introduced
a federated voting structure and altered membership rights and responsibilities to
deal with free rider problems. Agency problems in the West Liberty case were par-
tially dealt with through the production contracts used by members, and manage-
ment monitoring is evolving in the NABC case to address potential opportunism.
The NABC case illustrates how the failure to recognize capital constraints resulted
in the lack of co-op formation and how a different ﬁnancial structure may have
allowed a producer-driven organization to develop.
In addition to providing insights regarding problems with cooperative architec-
ture, the cases in group 3 also point to sources of cooperative advantage. In par-
ticular, although in the next section we discuss difﬁculties that cooperatives have
in accessing capital for business operation, the West Liberty Foods case in group 3
describes how cooperative formation can be necessary to secure access to capital. In
particular, by assuming ownership responsibilities (investment, risk, and manage-
rialoversight),growerssecuredthecapital(bothfrommembergrowersandlenders)
needed to continue operations for a processing facility that previous investor owners
had intended to shut down.
Capital
The ability of cooperatives to access sufﬁcient capital for their operations is, of
course,oneofthemostdiscussedissuesamongco-opleadersandresearchers.Thus,
not surprisingly, this issue cut across all the groups and was explicitly discussed in
many of the cases. However, although the issue was common, its manifestation was
different across the cases. Since the role of capital for the co-ops in groups 2 and 3
was discussed above, the focus of this section is on the role of capital for the co-ops
in group 1.
For co-ops in the ﬁrst group, the capital issue emerged explicitly in terms of a
rising debt-equity ratio, which eventually resulted in ﬁnancial difﬁculties. It would
be incorrect to conclude from this evidence, however, that access to additional cap-
ital would necessarily have solved the problem. As the SWP case illustrates, evenVol. 23[2009] vii
with access to large amounts of capital from its share conversion, the SWP still be-
came too heavily leveraged; indeed, the access to relatively easy capital was one of
the factors that allowed overconﬁdent managers to take control of the co-op and to
spend with virtually no restrictions.
With that caveat in place, what can be gleaned from a number of the cases –
this includes TVG, RGA, and Lilydale – is that a shortage of capital, combined
with a willingness by the board and management to heavily leverage their co-ops,
were the factors responsible for the co-ops getting into ﬁnancial trouble. As these
cases illustrate, management believed that the changes occurring in their industry
required them to redeﬁne their business operations and to integrate further along
the value chain. The case studies also make clear that these co-ops were unable to
access sufﬁcient capital from their members to allow the cooperative to undertake
this integration. Nevertheless, management leveraged their co-op’s operations so
the co-ops could participate in these additional activities. The result of this strategy,
however, was that the co-ops were unable to survive ﬁnancially and they either
declared bankruptcy or were acquired by or converted to an IOF.
The Pro-Fac case is interesting because it describes a co-op that took a differ-
ent path. Pro-Fac concluded that its best strategy was not to participate in the value
added processing and marketing segments of its industry, but instead to retrench
and focus its activities much nearer the farm level. DWG also pursued a different
strategy, opting to convert to an IOF when they had troubles raising capital through
their membership for a shift into more value-added activities (e.g., the snack food
sector). In contrast, the TVG, RGA, Lilydale, and SWP cases all illustrate situations
in which management tried, unsuccessfully, to push their operations into areas fur-
ther away from the farm gate. Further evidence for this view is also provided by
FRC (it is described in some detail in the RGA case), which emerged as a strong
player in the California rice industry by focusing its activities on bulk handling and
processing.
The pattern described above suggests that a structural shift may have indeed
taken place in agriculture, one with which it is increasingly difﬁcult for coopera-
tives to deal. As agriculture becomes more industrialized, the need for capital at the
processing and marketing levels increases. The question raised by the case studies
assembled in this special issue is whether cooperatives are able to access sufﬁcient
capital from their members to be able to effectively compete in these market levels.
It has long been noted that co-ops are typically located near the farm gate level
and that they have had trouble moving up and/or down the supply chain. Indeed,
this inability has been seen as problematic, since it indicates that co-ops may be
unable to integrate to the point in the supply chain where market power is an is-
sue. Nevertheless, some co-ops have been able to move beyond the bulk handling
of commodities and into processing. The interesting thing about the case studiesviii Journal of Cooperatives
assembled is that there is now some indication that even those co-ops that had been
able to successfully adopt this strategy in the past (e.g., TVA, RGA, Pro-Fac, DWG)
are now ﬁnding it difﬁcult to do so.
Property Rights and Portfolio Problems
The cases also highlighted the various property rights problems that have been
argued to affect cooperative structure and performance. Included among the prob-
lems that were discussed were the horizon problem, the free rider problem and
cross-subsidization through price pooling arrangements. The portfolio problem was
also discussed in a number of cases. As has been often argued in the literature and
as is seen in the case studies, one of the important impacts of these problems is on
capital availability.
The horizon problem was explicitly identiﬁed in the DWG case, where it was
argued that one of the factors leading to DWG’s conversion was the signiﬁcant
member resistance to the increased crop retains that were required when DWG
entered the snack food market. The horizon problem in this case may have been
exacerbatedbyaboardthatrepresentedoldergrowers.Similarconcernswerehinted
at in other cases. In the Lilydale and the SWP case, for instance, it was argued
that older members held a signiﬁcant share of the equity, and that numerous co-
op decisions were designed to ensure that these members were able to access their
equity.
TheDWGcasealsoprovidedanexampleofthefreeriderproblem–inthiscase,
the new members were able to free ride on the investments made by the existing
members. The result, particularly when combined with the horizon problem, was a
reluctance by the existing members to making investments in the co-op. The free
rider problem was also identiﬁed in the UPI case, where, as was discussed above, a
federated voting structure and altered membership rights and responsibilities were
introduced to deal with the problem.
Cross-subsidization across commodities was identiﬁed as a problem in the TVG
case where tomato and olive growers received higher payments than they would
have received in stand-alone pools (fruit producers, in turn, received a lower price).
Although cross-subsidization often has the effect of lowering member commitment
among those members who produce the product whose returns are being siphoned
off, in the TVG case this effect was relatively small (because of few outside options,
the fruit growers stayed with the co-op). Instead, the problem that emerged was that
TVG continued to invest in tomato processing, even when this market segment was
not doing well ﬁnancially. Thus, cross subsidization served to mask market signals
and to keep TVG in an operational rut that eventually bankrupted the co-op.Vol. 23[2009] ix
Finally,theportfolioproblemwasviewedasbeingimportantintheTVG,DGPC,
West Liberty and ANBC cases. Contracting with the co-op exposes members to
various degrees of both production and price risk, while investment in the co-op
results in investment risk. The ability or inability of producer members to take on
these risks was identiﬁed as being an important factor in the co-op’s organizational
structure decision.
Discussion and Concluding Comments
The cases assembled in this special issue provide a rich setting for examining
both the details of a number of cooperative conversion and restructurings, and gen-
eral lessons on the some of the larger cooperative problems and questions. They
also provide the jumping off point for additional research and investigation.
One of the questions that has long intrigued cooperative researchers is the ques-
tion of the efﬁciency and efﬁcaciousness of the cooperative business model. The
cases that have been assembled shed light on this question. They suggest that some
of the conversions and restructurings are due to what can simply be called poor
management, something that is not unique to co-ops, but is in fact common to all
business enterprises regardless of their structure.
At the same time, the cases also acknowledge that the common structural prob-
lems associated with cooperatives – namely lack of capital, property rights prob-
lems, and portfolio problems – do have an impact on the structure chosen by co-
operatives and their members. In this regard, the conversion examples arguably are
the most illuminating about the unique challenges that face cooperative businesses.
Cooperatives can be viewed as symptomatic of an underlying problem with in-
vestor ownership. They exist in the economy to ﬁll gaps in the provision of goods
and services, and to counteract market power. According to this view, the coopera-
tive business structure is a corrective measure, but also a costly one to be avoided if
it is not needed. They are costly because they must be ﬁnanced and governed: just
as there is no need for consumers to form a cooperative to purchase (or possibly
produce) pins and needles, neither should we expect farmers to form a cooperative
to buy or sell goods and services that are conveniently and competitively available
from investor-owned ﬁrms.
This view suggests at least two potential causes of pressure to convert from
cooperative to investor ownership. First, the existence and structure of any given
market evolves over time with changes in technology, consumer preferences, the
institutional framework supporting the market (e.g., antitrust enforcement), and rel-
evant state, federal, and international policy that may affect supply and demand
conditions. If the underlying problem with investor ownership is, to some extent,
remedied by these changes, a cooperative operating in this market may lose its rel-x Journal of Cooperatives
evance. The conversion at Lilydale and DGPC, and perhaps to a lesser extent, the
hostile takeover of AU, ﬁt this category of cause for conversion. Where at one time
early in their history these cooperatives each were a source of competitive pres-
sure in strongly oligopolistic markets, they each had become just another buyer in
increasingly competitive world markets for poultry and grain, respectively.
Second, once a cooperative is in place with physical assets and operating cap-
ital, it is natural for its management team to pursue growth in scale and scope of
operation. In a canonical setting for cooperative emergence where there is clearly an
absent market or severe market power abuse, managing a cooperative proﬁtably and
sustainably is a matter of competent administration, logistics, and accounting. How-
ever, as markets evolve and cooperatives ﬁnd themselves competing intensively for
member patronage, management is apt to take a more proactive and offensive ap-
proach in setting strategy. With a good management team, and some luck, it is pos-
sible to generate signiﬁcant ﬁrm value in following whatever strategy is put place.
Paradoxically, success of this sort can be the downfall of a cooperative. As soon
as a cooperative tries to provide members with liquidity through some form of earn-
ings distribution, it is inevitable that members seek and expect continued earnings.
With a focus on “earnings,” a cooperative loses its essential character to focus on
patron value. Additionally, without carefully designing equity management policies
that maintain primary control and equity stake in the hands of current patrons, it is
easy to end up with an intergenerational conﬂict, where members who are nearing
retirement want to cash out their ownership stake. Alternatively, if the market value
of a cooperative’s assets exceed book value by a sufﬁcient amount, it may be fea-
sible to get near unanimous support for conversion. The Diamond Walnut, DGPC
and FCStone cases seem to ﬁt this description.
The case studies also shed light on a related question of interest to cooperative
researchers, namely whether the structure of agriculture might affect the structure
and nature of cooperatives. The inference to be drawn from the cases is that, yes,
there may be a relationship. One of the hypotheses to emerge from the cases is
that the capital requirements of industrialized agriculture have increased to such a
degree that it is becoming increasingly difﬁcult for co-ops to operate much beyond
the farm gate. One of the implications of this hypothesis is that co-ops may ﬁnd
themselvesincreasinglyunabletointegrateuptothepointofthekeymarketfailures
(e.g., overly concentrated markets). If this is the case, then the ability of co-ops to
provide the “yardstick of competition” may be in jeopardy. The loss of such a role
could have a myriad of implications, including lessened support for an exemption
from antitrust rules.
At the same time, the case studies also suggest another link between the struc-
ture of agriculture and the structure of co-ops. As the West Liberty case illustrated,
the formation of a co-op was associated with a signiﬁcant shift in the structure of theVol. 23[2009] xi
contract between the grower and the processing facility. Further work is required to
determine if this linkage holds in the other direction – i.e., if shifts in the nature of
the contractual relationships in agriculture, as seen in agricultural industrialization,
have impacts on the structure of co-ops.
The case studies also suggested other areas of fruitful research. Understanding
the motivations of managers, for instance, as they increasingly leverage their oper-
ations, would appear to be important. Was such behavior due to overconﬁdence and
hubris, as suggested in the SWP case, or was it due to other factors such as a need
to satisfy the needs of particular member groups?
One issue that did not receive mention in the discussion above is fraud and
ﬁnancial misreporting. As the cases make clear, cooperatives are not immune from
this problem – this was an issue in at least three of the co-ops examined (RGA,
TVG, UPI). To date very little work has been done on this issue in co-ops, although
it has been receiving attention in the business literature. This lack of research may
be particularly signiﬁcant at the international level, where co-ops in developing
countries (and even in some developed countries) are known to be focal points for
corruption and government intervention.
To conclude, we would like to thank the authors for their work on these cases.
When the idea of a collection of case studies on cooperative conversions, failures
and restructurings was ﬁrst proposed, the interest by authors was immediate and
overwhelmingly positive. The authors shared our view that the case histories of a
number of the co-ops had to be completed while key individuals associated with the
co-ops were still available for interviews and while events were still relatively clear
in participants’ minds. A special thanks is due those individuals who participated
in interviews.
The authors’ initial enthusiasm was followed up with a commitment to getting
articles written and reviewed – the deadlines that were set were all met and the
special issue came out on time. We were also pleased that many of the authors were
able to present their cases at the November 2009 NCERA-210 Annual Meeting in
St. Paul, MN. The conference discussion was very useful in shaping the form of
publication and in providing the authors with feedback.
Notes
1. Included in this group were Tri Valley Growers (TVG), Rice Growers Association
(RGA), Agway, and Farmland Industries Ltd in the United States, and Saskatchewan Wheat
Pool(SWP),Agricore,Dairyworld,andLilydaleinCanada.TVGandRGAﬁledforbankruptcy
in 2000, followed by Agway and Farmland Industries in 2002. In 2001, Agricore was ac-
quired by United Grain Growers and Dairyworld was purchased by Saputo. Both SWP and
Lilydale converted to IOFs in 2005.